

Week of February 19, 2017

**Question 1** *Diffie–Hellman key exchange* (15 min)

Recall that in a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, there are values  $a$ ,  $b$ ,  $g$  and  $p$ . Alice computes  $g^a \bmod p$  and Bob computes  $g^b \bmod p$ .

- (a) Which of these values are publicly known and which must be kept private?
- (b) Eve can eavesdrop on everything sent between Alice and Bob, but can't change anything. Alice and Bob run Diffie-Hellman and have agreed on a shared symmetric key  $K$ . However, Bob accidentally sent his  $b$  to Alice in plain text. If Eve viewed all traffic since the beginning of the exchange, can she figure out what  $K$  is?
- (c) Mallory can not only view all Alice—Bob communications but also intercept and modify it. Alice and Bob perform Diffie-Hellman to agree on a shared symmetric key  $K$ . After the exchange, Bob gets the feeling something went wrong and calls Alice. He compares his value of  $K$  to Alice's and realizes that they are different. Explain what Mallory has done and what she can now do.

**Question 2 Perfect Forward Secrecy****(15 min)**

Alice (A) and Bob (B) want to communicate using some shared symmetric key encryption scheme. Consider the following key exchange protocols which can be used by A and B to agree upon a shared key,  $K_{ab}$ .

| <b>El Gamal-Based Key Exchange</b> |                                       |                          | <b>Diffe-Hellman Key Exchange</b> |                    |                                  |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|
| Message 1                          | <b>Protocol</b><br>$A \rightarrow B:$ | $\{K_{ab}\}_{K_B^{pub}}$ | Message 1                         | $A \rightarrow B:$ | $g^a \text{ mod } p$             |
|                                    | Key exchanged                         |                          | Message 2                         | $A \leftarrow B:$  | $g^b \text{ mod } p$             |
|                                    |                                       |                          |                                   | Key exchanged      | $K_{ab} = g^{ab} \text{ mod } p$ |
| Message 2                          | $A \leftarrow B:$                     | $\{secret1\}_{K_{ab}}$   | Message 3                         | $A \leftarrow B:$  | $\{secret1\}_{K_{ab}}$           |
| Message 3                          | $A \rightarrow B:$                    | $\{secret2\}_{K_{ab}}$   | Message 4                         | $A \rightarrow B:$ | $\{secret2\}_{K_{ab}}$           |

Some additional details:

- $K_B^{pub}$  is Bob's long-lived public key.
- All messages are destroyed immediately after reading them.
- $K_{ab}$  and DH exponents  $a$  and  $b$  are destroyed once all messages are sent.

Eavesdropper Eve records all communications between Alice and Bob, but is unable to decrypt them. At some point in the future, Eve is lucky and manages to compromise Bob's computer.

- (a) Is the confidentiality of Alice and Bob's prior El Gamal-based communication in jeopardy?
- (b) What about Alice and Bob's Diffie-Hellman-based communication?

**Question 3** *Why do RSA signatures need a hash?*

(20 min)

This question explores the design of standard RSA signatures in more depth. To generate RSA signatures, Alice first creates a standard RSA key pair:  $(n, e)$  is the RSA public key and  $d$  is the RSA private key, where  $n$  is the RSA modulus. For standard RSA signatures, we typically set  $e$  to a small prime value such as 3; for this problem, let  $e = 3$ .

To generate a standard RSA signature  $S$  on a message  $M$ , Alice computes  $S = H(M)^d \bmod n$ . If Bob wants to verify whether  $S$  is a valid signature on message  $M$ , he simply checks whether  $S^3 = H(M) \bmod n$  holds.  $d$  is a private key known only to Alice and  $(n, 3)$  is a publicly known verification key that anyone can use to check if a message was signed using Alice's private signing key.

Suppose RSA signatures skipped using a hash function and just used  $M$  directly, so the signature  $S$  on a message  $M$  is  $S = M^d \bmod n$ . In other words, if Alice wants to send a signed message to Bob, she will send  $(M, S)$  to Bob, where  $S = M^d \bmod n$  is computed using her private signing key  $d$ .

- (a) With this simplified RSA scheme, how can Bob verify whether  $S$  is a valid signature on message  $M$ ? In other words, what equation should he check, to confirm whether  $M, S$  was validly signed by Alice?
- (b) Mallory learns that Alice and Bob are using the simplified (hash-less) signature scheme described above and decides to trick Bob. Mallory wants to send some  $(M, S)$  to Bob that Bob will think is from Alice, even though Mallory doesn't know the private key. Explain how Mallory can find  $M, S$  such that  $S$  will be a valid signature on  $M$ .

You should assume that Mallory knows Alice's public key  $n$ , but not Alice's private key  $d$ . She can choose both  $M$  and  $S$  freely. The message  $M$  does not have to be chosen in advance and can be gibberish.

- (c) Is the attack in parts (b) possible against the real RSA signature scheme (the one that includes the cryptographic hash function)? Why or why not?