Web Security: Injection Attacks

CS 161: Computer Security
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Credit: some slides are adapted from previous offerings of this course and from CS 241 of Prof. Dan Boneh
What can go bad if a web server is compromised?

- Steal sensitive data (e.g., data from many users)
- Change server data (e.g., affect users)
- Gateway to enabling attacks on clients
- Impersonation (of users to servers, or vice versa)
- Others
A set of common attacks

 Daytona SQL Injection
 - Browser sends malicious input to server
 - Bad input checking leads to malicious SQL query

 XSS – Cross-site scripting
 - Attacker inserts client-side script into pages viewed by other users, script runs in the users’ browsers

 CSRF – Cross-site request forgery
 - Bad web site sends request to good web site, using credentials of an innocent victim who “visits” site
Today’s focus: injection attacks
Historical perspective

- The first public discussions of SQL injection started appearing around 1998

In the Phrack magazine

First published in 1985

**Fyodor**: "the best, and by far the longest running hacker zine"

- Hundreds of proposed fixes and solutions
Top web vulnerabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OWASP Top 10 – 2010 (Previous)</th>
<th>OWASP Top 10 – 2013 (New)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1 – Injection</td>
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<tr>
<td>A3 – Broken Authentication and Session Management</td>
<td>A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4 – Insecure Direct Object References</td>
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<tr>
<td>A6 – Security Misconfiguration</td>
<td>A5 – Security Misconfiguration</td>
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<tr>
<td>A7 – Insecure Cryptographic Storage – Merged with A9</td>
<td>A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure</td>
</tr>
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<td>A7 – Missing Function Level Access Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)</td>
<td>A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;buried in A6: Security Misconfiguration&gt;</td>
<td>A9 – Using Known Vulnerable Components</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please don’t repeat common mistakes!!
General code injection attacks

- Attacker user provides bad input
- Web server does not check input format
- Enables attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server
Example: code injection based on eval (PHP)

- **eval** allows a web server to evaluate a string as code
- e.g. `eval(''$result = 3+5')` produces 8

```php
$exp = $_GET['exp'];
eval(''$result = ' . $exp . ';');
```

Calculator: http://site.com/calc.php

Attack: http://site.com/calc.php?exp="3+5; system('rm *.*')"
Code injection using system()

Example: PHP server-side code for sending email

```php
$email = $_POST["email"]
$subject = $_POST["subject"]
system("mail $email -s $subject < /tmp/joinmynetwork")
```

Attacker can post

```
http://yourdomain.com/mail.php?
email=hacker@hackerhome.net &
subject=“foo < /usr/passwd; ls”
```
SQL injection
Structure of Modern Web Services

Browser

URL / Form
command.php?arg1=x&arg2=y

Web server

Database server
Structure of Modern Web Services

Browser

URL / Form
command.php?arg1=x&arg2=y

Web server

Database server

Database query built from x and y
Structure of Modern Web Services

Browser

Web server

Custom data corresponding to x & y

Database server
Structure of Modern Web Services

Web page built using custom data

Browser

Web server

Database server
Databases

**Structured** collection of data
- Often storing tuples/rows of related values
- Organized in tables

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AcctNum</td>
<td>Username</td>
<td>Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1199</td>
<td>zuckerberg</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0501</td>
<td>bgates</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
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</table>
Databases

- Widely used by web services to store server and user information
- Database runs as separate process to which web server connects
  - Web server sends `queries` or `commands` derived from incoming HTTP request
  - Database server returns associated values or modifies/updates values
**SQL**

- Widely used database query language
  - (Pronounced “ess-cue-ell” or “sequel”)

- Fetch a set of rows:
  
  ```
  SELECT column FROM table WHERE condition
  ```
  returns the value(s) of the given column in the specified table, for all records where `condition` is true.

- e.g:

  ```
  SELECT Balance FROM Customer
  WHERE Username='bgates'
  ```
  will return the value 79.2

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<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SQL (cont.)

Can add data to the table (or modify):

```
INSERT INTO Customer VALUES (8477, 'oski', 10.00);
```

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<td>oski</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
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</table>
SQL (cont.)

- Can delete entire tables:
  
  ```sql
  DROP TABLE Customer
  ```

- Issue multiple commands, separated by semicolon:
  
  ```sql
  INSERT INTO Customer VALUES (4433, 'vladimir', 70.0); SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer WHERE Username='vladimir'
  ```

  returns 4433.
SQL Injection Scenario

Suppose web server runs the following code:

```php
$recipient = $_POST['recipient'];
$sql = "SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer WHERE Username='$recipient' ";
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
```

- Server stores URL parameter “recipient” in variable `$recipient` and then builds up a SQL query
- Query returns recipient’s account number
- Server will send value of `$sql` variable to database server to get account #s from database
SQL Injection Scenario

Suppose web server runs the following code:

```php
$recipient = $_POST['recipient'];
$sql = "SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer WHERE Username='\$recipient' ";
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
```

So for "?recipient=Bob" the SQL query is:

"SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer WHERE Username='Bob' "
Basic picture: SQL Injection

1. post malicious form
   $recipient specified by attacker

2. unintended SQL query

3. receive valuable data

How can $recipient cause trouble here?
Problem

```php
$recipient = $_POST['recipient'];
$sql = "SELECT AcctNum FROM Customer WHERE Username='\$recipient' ";
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
```

Untrusted user input `recipient` is embedded directly into SQL command

**Attack:**

```php
$recipient = 'alice'; SELECT * FROM Customer;
```

Returns the entire contents of the Customer!
CardSystems Attack

- CardSystems
  - credit card payment processing company
  - SQL injection attack in June 2005
  - put out of business

- The Attack
  - 263,000 credit card #s stolen from database
  - credit card #s stored unencrypted
  - 43 million credit card #s exposed
The hbgaryfederal.com CMS was susceptible to a kind of attack called **SQL injection**. In common with other CMSes, the hbgaryfederal.com CMS stores its data in an SQL database, retrieving data from that database with suitable queries. Some queries are fixed—an integral part of the CMS application itself. Others, however, need parameters. For example, a query to retrieve an article from the CMS will generally need a parameter corresponding to the article ID number. These parameters are, in turn, generally passed from the Web frontend to the CMS.

It has been an embarrassing week for security firm HBGary and its HBGary Federal offshoot. HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr thought he had **unmasked the hacker hordes of Anonymous** and was preparing to name and shame those responsible for co-ordinating the group's actions, including the denial-of-service attacks that hit MasterCard, Visa, and other perceived enemies of WikiLeaks late last year.

When Barr **told** one of those he believed to be an Anonymous ringleader about his forthcoming exposé, the Anonymous response was swift and humiliating. **HBGary's servers were broken into, its e-mails pillaged and published to the world, its data destroyed, and its website defaced. As an added bonus, a second site owned...**
Another example: buggy login page (ASP)

```asp
set ok = execute( "SELECT * FROM Users
    WHERE user=' " & form("user") & " ' AND pwd=' " & form("pwd") & " '"
);

if not ok.EOF
    login success
else    fail;
```
Normal Query

SELECT * FROM Users WHERE user='me' AND pwd='1234' (1 row)
Another example: buggy login page (ASP)

```asp
set ok = execute( "SELECT * FROM Users
                   WHERE user='" & form("user") & "'
                   AND pwd='" & form("pwd") & "'"
               );

if not ok.EOF
    login success
else    fail;
```

Is this exploitable?
Bad input

Suppose user = "' or 1=1 -- " (URL encoded)

Then scripts does:

```java
ok = execute( SELECT ...
    WHERE user= ' ' or 1=1 -- ...
)
```

- The "--" causes rest of line to be ignored.
- Now ok.EOF is always false and login succeeds.

The bad news: easy login to many sites this way.

Besides logging in, what else can attacker do?
Even worse: delete all data!

Suppose user =

```
' ; DROP TABLE Users -- ''
```

Then script does:

```python
ok = execute( SELECT ...
               WHERE user= '' ; DROP TABLE Users ... )
```
What else can an attacker do?

- Add query to create another account with password, or reset a password

- Suppose user =
  ```
  "' ; INSERT INTO TABLE Users ('attacker', 'attacker secret');"
  ```

- And pretty much everything that can be done by running a query on the DB!
SQL Injection Prevention

- Sanitize user input: check or enforce that value/string that does not have commands of any sort
- Disallow special characters, or
- Escape input string

```
SELECT PersonID  FROM People WHERE Username='alice\'; SELECT * FROM People;'```
SQL Injection Prevention

- Avoid building a SQL command based on raw user input, use existing tools or frameworks.
- E.g. (1): the Django web framework has built-in sanitization and protection for other common vulnerabilities.
  - Django defines a query abstraction layer which sits atop SQL and allows applications to avoid writing raw SQL.
  - The execute function takes a SQL query and replaces inputs with escaped values.
- E.g. (2): Or use parameterized/prepared SQL.
Parameterized/prepared SQL

- Builds SQL queries by properly escaping args: ' → \'
- Example: Parameterized SQL: (ASP.NET 1.1)
  - Ensures SQL arguments are properly escaped.

```csharp
SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand(
    "SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE
    username = @User AND
    password = @Pwd", dbConnection);

cmd.Parameters.Add("@User", Request["user"]);
cmd.Parameters.Add("@Pwd", Request["pwd"]);
cmd.ExecuteReader();
```
How to prevent general injections

Similarly to SQL injections:

- Sanitize input from the user!
- Use frameworks/tools that already check user input
Hi, this is your son's school. We're having some computer trouble.

Oh, dear - did he break something?
In a way—
Summary

- Injection attacks were and are the most common web vulnerability.
- It is typically due to malicious input supplied by an attacker that is passed without checking into a command; the input contains commands or alters the command.
- Can be prevented by sanitizing user input.