

Software Security: Design, Privilege Separation

CS 161: Computer Security

Prof. David Wagner

January 27, 2016


Robustness

- Security bugs are a fact of life
- How can we use access control to improve the security of software, so security bugs are less likely to be catastrophic?

Privilege separation


- How can we improve the security of software, so security bugs are less likely to be catastrophic?
- Answer: privilege separation.
Architect the software so it has a separate, small TCB.
 - Then any bugs outside the TCB will not be catastrophic

Web browser



“Drive-by malware”: malicious web page exploits a browser bug to read/write local files or infect them with a virus

The Chrome browser



Goal: prevent “drive-by malware”, where a malicious web page exploits a browser bug to read/write local files or infect them with a virus




The Chrome browser

70% of vulnerabilities are in the rendering engine.

1000K lines of code

Example: PNG, WMF, GDI+ rendering vulnerabilities in Windows OS

HTML, JS, ...



Rendered Bitmap

700K lines of code

Benefit of Secure Design

Browser	Known unpatched vulnerabilities					
	Secunia					SecurityFocus
	Extremely critical (number / oldest)	Highly critical (number / oldest)	Moderately critical (number / oldest)	Less critical (number / oldest)	Not critical (number / oldest)	Total (number / oldest)
Internet Explorer 6	0	0	4 17 November 2004	8 27 February 2004	12 5 June 2003	534 20 November 2000
Internet Explorer 7	0	0	1 30 October 2006	4 6 June 2006	10 5 June 2003	213 15 August 2006
Internet Explorer 8	0	0	0	1 26 February 2007	8 5 June 2003	123 14 January 2009
Internet Explorer 9	0	0	0	0	2 6 December 2011	26 5 March 2011
Firefox 3.6	0	0	0	0	0	1 20 December 2011
Firefox 38	0	0	0	0	0	0
Google Chrome 42	0	0	0	0	0	0
Opera 11	0	0	0	0	1 6 December 2011	2 6 December 2011
Safari 5	0	0	0	1 8 June 2010	0	2 13 December 2011

BE GOOD WITH YOUR MONEY FROM THE BIG PICTURE TO THE DETAILS THAT MATTER

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
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Effortlessly create budgets that are easy to stick to. We even make a few for you.



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Find out yours and learn how you can improve it. It's totally free.



Discuss with a partner

- How would you architect mint.com to reduce the likelihood of a catastrophic security breach?
 - E.g., where attacker steals all users' stored passwords or empties out all their bank accounts overnight

Summary

- Access control is a key part of security.
- Privilege separation makes systems more robust: it helps reduce the impact of security bugs in your code.
- Architect your system to make the TCB unbypassable, tamper-resistant, and verifiable (small).

Software Security: Principles

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January 29, 2016



TL-15



TL-30



TRTL-30



TXTL-60

“Security is economics.”

µTorrent 1.7.1

File Options Help

<Search Here>


	Name	#	Size	Done	Status	Seeds	Peers	Down Speed	Up Speed	ETA	Uploaded	Ratio	Avail.	Label
All (3)														
Downloading (3)	OOo_2.2.1_Win32Intel_install_wj...	1	108 MB	75.7%	Downloading	55 (73)	5 (83)	397.5 kB/s	6.6 kB/s	57s	528 kB	0.006	56...	
Completed (0)	KNOPPIX_V5.1.1DVD-2007-01-04...	2	4.02 GB	0.7%	Downloading	56 (60)	9 (244)	187.0 kB/s	25.3 kB/s	6h 30m	2.95 MB	0.102	56...	
Active (2)	ubuntu-7.04-desktop-i386.iso	3	697 MB	0.0%	Queued	0 (641)	0 (54)			∞	0.0 kB	0.000	0.000	
Inactive (1)														
No Label (3)														

What does this program do?


General Peers Pieces Files Speed Logger

IP	Client	Flags	%	Down Speed	Up Speed	Reqs	Uploaded	Downloaded	Peer dl.
cpe-24-92-249-186.twny.res.rr.com	Azureus/2.5.0.4	d XE	100.0						
cpe-24-162-126-147.hot.res.rr.com	Transmission 0.80-svn	d IX	100.0	3.1 kB/s				32.0 kB	
24-177-50-115.dhcp.oxfr.ma.charter.com	µTorrent 1.7	d IHXE	100.0					1.64 MB	
24-178-114-166.dhcp.wspn.ga.charter.com	µTorrent 1.6.1	d IHXE	100.0					48.0 kB	
wsp05957058wss.cr.net.cable.rogers.com	KTorrent 2.2rc1	d IHXE	100.0	5.2 kB/s				544 kB	
cust.13.6.adsl.cistron.nl	µTorrent 1.6.1	D IHXE	100.0	0.4 kB/s		2 0			
cpe-66-8-185-105.hawaii.res.rr.com	Azureus/2.5.0.4	d XE	100.0						
66.65.59.37	BitTorrent 5.0.7	d IX	100.0	2.7 kB/s				48.0 kB	
66-214-179-78.dhcp.gldl.ca.charter.com	KTorrent 2.2	IHX	0.0						
67.85.64.225	µTorrent/1.6.0.0	D HXE	100.0	9.5 kB/s		4 0		144 kB	
bas2-stcatharines10-1177764066.dsl.bell.ca	µTorrent 1.6.1	UD HXE	10.8	2.2 kB/s	2.8 kB/s	2 2	512 kB	256 kB	288.2 k...
wsp-70-184-249-191.ok.ok.cox.net	µTorrent 1.6.1	D IHXE	100.0	17.7 kB/s		16 0		2.35 MB	
70.186.189.141	Azureus/3.0.1.6	d XE	100.0						
71-10-91-182.dhcp.roch.mn.charter.com	KTorrent 2.2	d IXE	100.0					16.0 kB	
c-71-63-128-140.hsd1.mn.comcast.net	µTorrent 1.7	D HXE	100.0	10.4 kB/s		4 0		1.98 MB	
adsl-71-131-190-233.dsl.sntc01.pacbell.net	µTorrent 1.6.1	D HXE	100.0	4.7 kB/s		3 0		304 kB	
adsl-71-145-148-192.dsl.austtx.sbcglobal.net	BitTorrent 5.0.7	D IX	100.0	1.0 kB/s		2 0		224 kB	
72.24.208.255	Azureus/2.5.0.4	DS XE	100.0			2 0		32.0 kB	
72.93.219.133	µTorrent/1.6.0.0	d IHXE	100.0						
72.150.126.8	Azureus/3.0.1.6	ud IX	7.4						
ip72-202-139-196.ks.ks.cox.net	µTorrent 1.6.1	D HXE	100.0	2.6 kB/s		3 0		112 kB	
74.0.64.160	Mainline 4.0.1	D IX	100.0	4.8 kB/s		3 0		176 kB	

DHT: 278 nodes D: 606.7 kB/s T: 112.1 MB U: 33.0 kB/s T: 4.2 MB



What *can* this program do?



Can it delete all of your files?

YES. Why?

“Least privilege.”

Touchstones for *Least Privilege*

- When assessing the security of a system's design, identify the *Trusted Computing Base (TCB)*.
 - What components does security **rely upon**?
- Security requires that the TCB:
 - Is **correct**
 - Is **complete** (can't be bypassed)
 - Is itself **secure** (can't be tampered with)
- Best way to be assured of correctness and its security?
 - **KISS** = *Keep It Simple, Stupid!*
 - Generally, **Simple** = **Small**
- One powerful design approach: **privilege separation**
 - Isolate privileged operations to as small a component as possible
 - (See lecture notes for more discussion)

Check for Understanding

- We've seen that PC platforms grant applications a lot of privileges
- Quiz: Name a platform that does a better job of least privilege



“Ensure complete mediation.”

Ensuring Complete Mediation

- To secure access to some capability/resource, construct a *reference monitor*
- Single point through which all access must occur
 - E.g.: a network firewall
- Desired properties:
 - **Un-bypassable** (“complete mediation”)
 - **Tamper-proof** (is itself secure)
 - **Verifiable** (correct)
 - (Note, just restatements of what we want for TCBs)
- One subtle form of reference monitor flaw concerns *race conditions* ...

TOCTTOU Vulnerability

```
procedure withdrawal(w)
  // contact central server to get balance
  1. let b := balance

  2. if b < w, abort

  // contact server to set balance
  3. set balance := b - w

  4. dispense $w to user
```

TOCTTOU = Time of Check To Time of Use


```
public void buyItem(Account buyer, Item item) {  
    if (item.cost > buyer.balance)  
        return;  
    buyer.possessions.put(item);  
    buyer.possessionsUpdated();  
    buyer.balance -= item.cost;  
    buyer.balanceUpdated();  
}
```



571-7
MISSILE SITE
STATUS

MSA





SET CODE USED

LAUNCH

WAR PLAN
LAUNCH CONTROL

DO NOT TOUCH THIS CONTROL
UNLESS YOU ARE TRAINED TO DO SO
IF YOU ARE TRAINED TO DO SO
DO NOT TOUCH THIS CONTROL
UNLESS YOU ARE TRAINED TO DO SO
IF YOU ARE TRAINED TO DO SO

2
3
4
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9
0



“Separation of responsibility.”

California
THE IDES OF MARCH THE
PARANORMAL ACTIVITY 3 RUM DIARY



Coming Up ...

- Homework 1 due Monday
- Project 1 is now available