I am aware of the Berkeley Campus Code of Student Conduct and acknowledge that academic misconduct will be reported to the Center for Student Conduct.

SIGN your name: 

PRINT your class account login: cs161-_____ and SID: _______________

Your TA’s name: ____________________________

Your section day & time: ____________________________

Name of the person sitting to your left: _______________ Name of the person sitting to your right: _______________

You may consult one sheet of paper (double-sided) of notes. You may not consult other notes, textbooks, etc. Calculators, computers, and other electronic devices are not permitted. If you think a question is ambiguous, choose the most reasonable assumption and document your assumption clearly.

You have 90 minutes. There are 7 questions, of varying credit (100 points total). The questions are of varying difficulty, so avoid spending too long on any one question.
Problem 1  *True or False, and Fill-me-in*  (12 points)

In parts (a) and (b), circle True or False. In parts (c), fill in the blank. Do not justify your answer.

(a) **True or False:** A problem with iframes is that if a user visits an attacker’s website, that website could load a bank website inside `<iframe>` tags and read sensitive data from this website.

(b) **True or False:** A site that implements and requires a hidden validation token in a form value for requests, in addition to authentication cookies, but is vulnerable to XSS attacks, is safe from CSRF attacks.

(c) Consider the following setup: an operating system has access to sensitive files, a sandbox runs on top of the operating system, and a potentially-compromised application runs inside the sandbox. The sandbox does not allow the application to access any local files.

In preventing an attacker from gaining access to the sensitive files, the minimum trusted code base is

(d) An attacker tries to mount an XSS attack on a forum application. He inserts the string below into a comments form and clicks submit.

```
Type your comment here:
<script>document.write("You were attacked!");</script>
```

The web server correctly escapes all inputs it receives using HTML escaping, then it stores them in a database. Alice comes to this forum and visits a page where she can see every comment including this one.

Write down the exact string Alice will see in her browser when she views the attacker’s comment.
Problem 2  Multiple choice  (12 points)

(a) When you pay for something online using PayPal, the PayPal checkout form that shows the price and asks for your PayPal login always appears on its own page, never embedded in an iframe on the seller’s checkout page. What threat is this defending against? Circle the best answer.

- XSS
- Integer overflow
- CSRF
- SQL injection
- Clickjacking
- Same-origin policy
- Buffer overruns
- Drive-by malware
- None of the above

(b) NinjaCourses.com is written in Python. Sheryl decides to rewrite it in C, ensuring her re-implementation behaves the same. Assuming Sheryl tries to make her C implementation have the same functionality as the Python implementation, what new security threats might Sheryl’s C code face that aren’t equally applicable to the original Python code? Circle all that apply.

- XSS
- CSRF
- Clickjacking
- Buffer overruns
- Phishing
- SQL injection
- Separation of responsibility
- Two-factor authentication
- None of the above

(c) After finishing her C code, Sheryl does CS 161’s project 1 and learns for the first time about the ret2esp technique. Which of the following provides a complete defense against ret2esp attacks? Circle all that apply.

- Non-executeable Stack
- Referer validation
- Content Security Policy (CSP)
- Same-origin policy
- Memory-safe programming languages
- Least privilege
- Prepared statements
- Two-factor authentication
- None of the above
Problem 3  Web security  (15 points)

Patsy-Bank learned about the CSRF flaw on their site described in discussion section, and they hired a security consultant who helped them fix it by adding a random CSRF token to the sensitive /transfer request. A valid request now looks like:

https://patsy-bank.com/transfer?to=bob&amount=10&token=<random>

The CSRF token is chosen randomly, separately for each user.

Not one to give up easily, Mallory starts looking at the welcome page. She loads the following URL in her browser:

https://patsy-bank.com/welcome?name=<script>alert("Jackpot!");</script>

When this page loaded, Mallory saw an alert pop up that says “Jackpot!”. She smiles, knowing she can now force other bank customers to send her money.

(a) What kind of attack is the welcome page vulnerable to? Provide the name of the category of attack.

(b) Mallory plans to use this vulnerability to bypass the CSRF token defense. She’ll replace the alert("Jackpot!"); with some carefully chosen JavaScript. What should her JavaScript do? (Describe using at most 1–2 sentences.)

(c) If Patsy-Bank added frame-busting code to the welcome page, would that stop this attack? Circle yes or no.

Yes  No

(d) Mallory wants to attack Bob, a customer of Patsy-Bank. Name one way that Mallory could try to get Bob to click on a link she constructed.
Problem 4  Evaluating defenses  
(16 points)
Michael is considering several ideas for defending against some of the threats we’ve seen in this class. For each of the following scenarios, decide whether Michael’s proposed defense is secure or not (i.e., whether it is effective at defending against the named threat). Circle “Secure” or “Insecure”; if you circle “Insecure”, also describe in a sentence or less how an attacker could defeat Michael’s defense.

(a) Michael notices that a bank is vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To defend against CSRF, Michael proposes that the bank add a X-Frame-Options header to every page.

Secure  Insecure
Attack:

(b) To prevent buffer overruns, Michael proposes to allocate all buffers on the heap. In other words, even if a buffer is declared as a local variable, Michael proposes that the compiler should insert a call to malloc() to allocate space for the buffer, and free the buffer when the function returns.

Secure  Insecure
Attack:

(c) To prevent phishers from using homeographic attacks using internationalized characters (e.g., paypal.com, where the first p is in Cyrillic), Michael proposes that browsers should allow only the characters A-Za-z0-9_. to appear in the domain name of a URL; if the domain name contains any other characters, the browser should refuse to load the URL.

Secure  Insecure
Attack:

(d) To prevent session fixation attacks, Michael proposes to use 256-bit session IDs, where the first 128 bits are chosen randomly for each session, and the last 128 bits are a secret value that is specific to the server but the same for all sessions with that server.

(As a reminder, session fixation attacks apply to sites that accept a session ID in the URL and set a session cookie with the same value.)

Secure  Insecure
Attack:
Problem 5  Reasoning about memory safety  

Consider the following C code.

```c
/* Requires: ??? */
void shuffle(int a[], int b[], size_t m, size_t n) {
    for (size_t i = 0; i < m; i++) {
        int tmp = a[i];
        a[i] = b[n-i];
        b[n-i] = tmp;
    }
}
```

For each of the following candidate preconditions in parts (a)–(d), answer whether that precondition is sufficient to ensure that `shuffle()` will be memory-safe. If it is not sufficient, also specify an example of an input that would satisfy the precondition but could cause memory-unsafe behavior.

(a) `a != NULL && b != NULL`

- **Sufficient**
- **Not sufficient**

Input:

(b) `a != NULL && b != NULL && m == 0 && n == 0`

- **Sufficient**
- **Not sufficient**

Input:

(c) `a != NULL && b != NULL && m == n`

- **Sufficient**
- **Not sufficient**

Input:

(d) `a != NULL && b != NULL && m < size(a) && n < size(b)`

- **Sufficient**
- **Not sufficient**

Input:

(e) Suggest a better precondition. Your precondition should be sufficient to ensure that `shuffle()` is memory-safe, and be as general as possible. Don’t worry about what `shuffle()` is trying to accomplish; it just needs to be memory-safe.
Problem 6  *Secure design and implementation*  

(a) Blackbeard decides to set up his own course scheduling site, PirateCourses.com. To manage this machine remotely, he installs a SSH server on it. He discovers that the version of SSH he is running is vulnerable to a buffer overflow exploit, but he’s too lazy to upgrade. Instead, he configures the SSH daemon to run on a custom port, 5467. However, when he logs in a week later, he finds all his data gone. What security principle did he ignore?

(b) Blackbeard fixes this, and his website is now flourishing. He hires Alice to implement tagging, so users can add tags to courses and search for courses by tag. For instance, when a user searches for the tag `easy_exams`, the following page is loaded:

```
http://www.piratecourses.com/?query=easy_exams
```

That page contains a list of all courses with the `easy_exams` tag.

Unfortunately, Alice doesn’t know how to write secure code. Crabby the crab searches for the tag `courses that are easy to`; drop table users -- and suddenly none of the PirateCourses users can log in any more. What kind of vulnerability was this?

(c) Name two different reasonable techniques that Alice could have used that each would have prevented the vulnerability in part (b).

Defense 1:

Defense 2:
Problem 7  **Snooping on your friends**  (11 points)

Alice sets up a private wiki page for her friends, running on scripts.berkeley.edu, at

https://scripts.berkeley.edu/~alice/wiki

Alice has a session cookie in her browser for the wiki page, which is still valid for two weeks from now. When she visits the wiki site, she is immediately logged in and can read the content.

Eve doesn’t have an account on Alice’s wiki, but is dying to read what Alice and her friends are saying on that wiki page. Eve has her own web site running on scripts.berkeley.edu, at

https://scripts.berkeley.edu/~eve/

Consider that Eve manages to get Alice to visit Eve’s page. How can Eve get a copy of Alice’s wiki page?

Note that Alice is security savvy and she employs the following security techniques:

1. Her wiki employs CSRF protection correctly so a CSRF attack won’t work.

2. The session cookie is httpOnly so JavaScript cannot access it.

3. Alice is not susceptible to phishing attacks. She checks the URL carefully wherever she goes (including the unicode!). When she visits a site that is not hers, including Eve’s site, she does not provide her password or other sensitive information.

4. Alice will not click on anything in Eve’s page other than visiting the page.

5. She scopes her cookies with domain=scripts.berkeley.edu and a path corresponding to ~alice/wiki, so that other users’ servers on scripts.berkeley.edu won’t receive her cookies.

Describe Eve’s attack here: