

# Computer Science 161: Computer Security

Computer Science 161 Fall 2016

Popa and Weaver



**Prof. Raluca Ada Popa**



**Nicholas Weaver**

<http://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs161/>


# And a team of talented TAs



Apoorva Dornadula



Rebecca Portnoff



Warren He




Mitar



Rohan Mathuria



Rohit Sinha



Calvin Li



# What is security?

Enforcing a desired property in the presence of an attacker



data confidentiality

user privacy

data and computation integrity

authentication

availability

...

# Today's outline

- Why is security important?
- Course logistics
- Intro to security principles

# Why is security important?

Obama unveils cybersecurity proposals:  
'Cyber threats are urgent and growing  
danger'



# Why is security important?

It is important for our

- physical safety
- confidentiality/privacy
- functionality
- protecting our assets
- successful business
- a country's economy and safety
- and so on...

# Physical safety threats

## Pacemaker hack can kill via laptop

By [Jeremy Kirk](#), IDG News Service

Oct 21, 2012 11:44 AM

**Business**

## **FBI probe of alleged plane hack sparks worries over flight safety**

# Privacy/confidentiality

**91% OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE REPORTED A DATA BREACH IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS.**

By [elxradmin](#) Posted [May 29, 2015](#) in [health IT, security](#)

   0

**EVERYDAY MONEY** IDENTITY THEFT

## Data Breach Tracker: All the Major Companies That Have Been Hacked

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Breaches in 2015 [ITRC]:

Number of breaches = 5,497

Number of Records = 818,004,561

# Can affect a country's economy

KIM ZETTER SECURITY 03.03.16 7:00 AM

## INSIDE THE CUNNI UNPRECEDENTED UKRAINE'S POWER



too were nearing the end of their shift. But just as one worker was organizing papers at his desk that day, the cursor on his computer suddenly skittered across the screen of its own accord.

He watched as it navigated purposefully toward buttons controlling the circuit breakers at a substation in the region and then clicked on a box to open the breakers and take the substation offline. A dialogue window popped up on screen asking to confirm the action, and the operator stared dumbfounded as the cursor glided to the box and clicked to affirm. Somewhere in a region outside the city he knew that thousands of residents had just lost their lights and heaters.



■ ■ ■

# Why World War III will be fought on the internet

*S.E. Smith*

# What is hackable?

- Everything!
- Especially things connected to the Internet

## For The First Time, Hackers Have Used A Refrigerator To Attack Businesses



JULIE BORT



Jan. 16, 2014, 1:36 PM

🔥 195,469

💬 39

One needs to consider security for any  
part of computer systems

# Course logistics

# Course structure

- Intro to security
  - memory safety, OS principles
- Cryptography
- Network Security
- Web Security
- Miscellaneous topics

# Grading structure

- Absorb material presented in lectures and section
  - **Please attend lecture!**
- 3 course projects (24% total)
  - Done individually or in small groups
- 3-4 homework (16% total)
  - Done individually
- Two midterms (30%)
- A comprehensive final exam (30%)

# Class Policies

- Late homework: no credit
- Late project: <24 hours: -10%, <48 hours: -20%, <72 hours: -40%,  $\geq 72$  hours: no credit
- Never share solutions, code, etc or let other students see them. Work on your own unless it is a group assignment
- Don't use our slides to answer questions during class
- Sign up for a class account
- Participate in Piazza
  - Email doesn't scale: course related questions/comments should be on Piazza or asked during office hours



# Textbooks

- No required textbook. If you want additional reading
- ***Optional:*** *Introduction to Computer Security*, Goodrich & Tamassia
- ***Optional:*** *The Craft of System Security*, Smith & Marchesini
- We will also make available interesting readings online

# Intellectual Honesty Policy: Detection and *Retribution*

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- We view those who would cheat as “attackers”
  - This includes sharing code on homework or projects, midterms, finals, etc...
  - But through this class we (mostly) assume rational attackers
    - Benefit of attack > **Expected** cost of the attack
      - Cost of launching attack + cost of getting caught \* probability of getting caught
- We take a detection and response approach
  - We use many tools to detect violations
    - "Obscurity is not security", but obscurity can help.  
Just let it be known that "We Have Ways"
  - We will go to DEFCON 1 (aka "launch the nukes") **immediately**
    - “Nick doesn’t make threats. **He keeps promises**”



# Ethics Guide for Defense Against the Dark Arts

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- Of necessity, this class has a fair amount of "dark arts" content
  - As defenders you must understand the offense:  
You can't learn defense against the dark arts without including the dark arts
  - But a lot of "don't try this at home" stuff
- Big key is **consent**
  - Its usually OK to break into **your own stuff** (modulo the DMCA)
    - Its a great way to evaluate systems
  - Its usually OK to break into someone else's stuff **with explicit permission to do so**
  - It is both grossly unethical and often **exceedingly criminal** to access systems without authorization



# Also...

- There exists a classic game theory problem called the Prisoner's Dilemma
- For single-round Prisoner's Dilemma, the optimum strategy is "always-defect"
- For multi-round Prisoner's Dilemma, the optimum strategy in practice is "tit-for-tat"
  - AKA, be nice unless someone isn't nice to you
- Life is **multi-round**:  
so be excellent to each other!
  - Making things hostile for others makes the world worse for all
  - Stopping things from being hostile to others makes the world better for you



# Stress Management & Mental Health...

- We'll try to not over-stress you too much
  - But there really is a lot to cover and this really is a demanding major
- We are going to somewhat front-load the 3 projects
  - Since everybody else has stuff due at the very end
- If you feel overwhelmed, please use the resources available
  - Academically: Ask on Piazza, Tutoring, Office hours
  - Non-Academic: Take advantage of University Health Services if you need to
    - ***I did!*** Zoloft (an antidepressant) and therapy saved my life, twice.

# Webcasts?

## Yes

- Benefits of webcasts:
  - Allows students to catch up on lecture at some other time
  - ~~Allows sharing the lecture with a larger community~~
    - This **would** be a benefit, but the University won't pay for human-done captions, while YouTube's automatic captions could get the University sued!
- Costs of webcasts:
  - Students may not attend class because “hey, webcast”
    - But webcast has less context, and we will have your TAs note if you avoid lecture
  - Both of us like to use the blackboard
    - Which is not captured in this room
  - Nick has occasional outbursts of profanity
- But we're doing it.

# Some Philosophy

- The rest of this lecture is largely focused on philosophical issues
- People and Money
- Threat Model
- OODA loops and decision cycles
- Prevention, Detection & Response, Mitigation and Recovery
- False Positives, False Negatives, and Compositions
- And then some real word security tips



# It All Comes Down To People... The Attacker(s)

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- People attack systems for some reason
  - If there are no attackers, there is no computer security problem
- They may do it for money
- They may do it for politics
- They may do it for the lulz
- They may just want to watch the world burn
- Often the most effective security is to attack the **reasons** for an attacker
  - "We are sick of playing whak-a-mole on bad guys...  
Instead we play whak-a-mole on bad-guy business models"

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# It All Comes Down to People...

## The Users

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- If a security system is unusable it will be used
  - Or at least so greatly resented that users will actively attempt to subvert it:  
"Let's set the nuclear launch code to 00000000"  
(oh, and write down the password anyway!)
- Users will subvert systems anyway
- Programmers will make mistakes
  - And mistakes are tied to the tools they use
  - "If you don't loath C and C++ by the time this class is over we have failed"
- And Social Engineering...
  - "Because there is no patch for Human Stupidity"



# But Don't Blame The Users...

- Often we blame the user when an attacker takes advantage of them...
- Yet we've consistently constructed systems that encourage users to do the wrong thing!
- Phishing is a classic example:
  - Which is a phishing email and which is an actual email from Chase?



# Oh, and it comes down to money too...

- "You don't put a \$10 lock on a \$1 rock..."
  - Unless the attacker can **leverage** that \$1 rock to attack something more important
- "You don't risk exposing a \$1M zero-day on a nobody"
  - So I'm quite content to use my iPhone in a hostile environment:  
free market cost of a zero-day (unknown/unpatchable) exploit for iOS is \$500k to \$1M.
- Cost/benefit analyses appear all throughout security



# At the Same Time: Update your iPhones...

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- I share an office with Bill Marczak...
  - He works with peace activists in the Middle East...
  - One of them received a suspicious text
    - It looked like an iOS attack
- He took my GF's old iPhone...
  - Set it through a monitored network tunnel...
  - Click on link...
  - We wait
  - And wait...
  - And the phone got pwned!
- More on how it got pwned on Tuesday...



Needs to replace phone with  
\$300 iPod Touch



Needs to Replace \$1M  
Exploit That No Longer Works




# A Bit of Military Jargon: The OODA Loop

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
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- You may have heard of the "OODA Loop"
  - Observe, Orient, Decide, Act cycle
- Originally developed by a military fighter pilot, Colonel John Boyd, as a way of modeling how adversaries think
  - If you can outthink your adversary, you win!
- Designed to provide a framework to think about thinking



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# The Real OODA Loop



[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA\\_loop#/media/File:OODA.Boyd.svg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop#/media/File:OODA.Boyd.svg) by Patrick Moran



# Prevention

- The goal of prevention is to stop the "bad thing" from happening at all
- On one hand, if prevention works its great
  - E.g. if you don't write in an unsafe language (like C) you will **never** worry about buffer overflow exploits
- On the other hand, if you can **only** depend on prevention...
  - You get Bitcoin and Bitcoin thefts
  - The latest: \$68M stolen from a Bitcoin exchange



# Detection & Response

- Detection: See that something is going wrong
- Response: Actually **do** something about it
- Without some response, what is the point of detecting something being wrong?



## Burglar Alarms Cops Won't Answer



Jacquie Simms, left, leader of the Watts neighborhood council, and fellow Watts residents Milton Smith and his wife, Bernece, are seen outside the Smith's home, which is equipped with a burglar alarm, in Los Angeles, Friday, Feb. 7, 2003. / AP

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# False Positive and False Negatives

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
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- False positive:
  - You alert when there is nothing there
- False negative:
  - You fail to alert when something is there
- This is the real cost of detection:
  - Responding to false positives is not free
    - And too many false positives and alarms get removed
  - False negatives mean a failure



# Defense in Depth

- The notion of layering multiple types of protection together
  - EG, the Theodosian Walls of Constantinople:  
Moat -> wall -> depression -> even bigger wall
    - And some towers to rain down flaming and pointy death on those caught up in the defenses
- Hypothesis is that attacker needs to breach all the defenses
  - At least until something comes along to make the defense irrelevant like, oh, say siege cannons
- But defense in depth isn't free:
  - You are throwing more resources at the problem
  - You can have a increased false positive rate:  
If D1 has rate FP1 and D2 has rate FP2,  
a composition where either can alert has:  
$$FP = FP1 + (1-FP1) * FP2$$



# Mitigation & Recovery...

- OK, something bad happened...
- Now what?
- Assumption: bad things **will** happen in the system
- So can we design things so we can get back working?
- So how do I plan for earthquakes?
- "1 week of stay put and 50+ miles of get outta town"






# Real World Security...

## How is your account breached?

- Humans can't remember good passwords...
  - Well, we can remember a couple good passwords, but that's about it





~28 BITS OF ENTROPY

$2^{28} = 3 \text{ DAYS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$


(PLAUSIBLE ATTACK ON A WEAK REMOTE WEB SERVICE. YES, CRACKING A STOLEN HASH IS FASTER, BUT IT'S NOT WHAT THE AVERAGE USER SHOULD WORRY ABOUT.)

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: **EASY**

WAS IT TROMBONE? NO, TROUBADOR. AND ONE OF THE 0s WAS A ZERO?

AND THERE WAS SOME SYMBOL...

DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: **HARD**



~44 BITS OF ENTROPY

$2^{44} = 550 \text{ YEARS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: **HARD**

THAT'S A BATTERY STAPLE.

CORRECT!

DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: YOU'VE ALREADY MEMORIZED IT

THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.


# Real World Security...


## How is your account breached?

- So we compensate with password ***reuse***
  - You use the same lame password on a large number of sites that ***hopefully*** don't matter
- One of those sites gets breeched...
  - And now the bad guy has your password
  - And can now log into all those other sites where you used the same password...









# So what to do?

## Password Managers

- A program which runs on your computer or phone
  - You enter a master password to unlock an encrypted store
  - It can then enter passwords for you in websites
  - It can also generate strong, unique, random passwords
- Often include cloud syncing as well
  - So you **better** make sure your master password is good
  - But now means you have your master password everywhere
- Several options, I personally like 1password but there are others as well
  - EG, others like Keepass



**1password**