Key management on whiteboard
Password hashing in these slides
Announcement

- Project 2 part 1 due today
Passwords

Tension between usability and security

- choose memorable passwords
- choose random and long passwords (hard to guess)
The 25 Most Popular Passwords of 2015: We're All Such Idiots

1. 123456 (Unchanged)
2. password (Unchanged)
3. 12345678 (Up 1)
4. qwerty (Up 1)
5. 12345 (Down 2)
6. 123456789 (Unchanged)
7. football (Up 3)
8. 1234 (Down 1)
**Attack mechanisms**

- **Online guessing attacks**
  - Attacker tries to login by guessing user’s password
- **Social engineering and phishing**
  - Attacker fools user into revealing password
- **Eavesdropping**
  - Network attacker intercepts plaintext password on the connection
- **Client-side malware**
  - Key-logger/malware captures password when inserted and sends to attacker
- **Server compromise**
  - Attacker compromises server, reads storage and learns passwords
Defences/mitigations

Network eavesdropper:
• Encrypt traffic using SSL (will discuss later)

Client-side malware: hard to defend
• Use two-factor authentication
• Intrusion detection mechanisms – detect malware when it is being inserted into the network
• Various security software (e.g., anti-virus)
Mitigations for online-guessing attacks

- Rate-limiting
  - Impose limit on number of passwords attempts

- CAPTCHAs: to prevent automated password guessing

- Password requirements: length, capital letters, characters, etc.
Mitigations for server compromise

• Suppose attacker steals the database at the server including all password information
• Storing passwords in plaintext makes them easy to steal
• Further problem: users reuse passwords at different sites!

Don’t store passwords in plaintext at server!
Hashing passwords

• Server stores hash(password) for each user using a cryptographic hash function
  – hash is a one-way function

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>username</th>
<th>hash of password</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>hash(Alice’s password)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob</td>
<td>hash(Bob’s password)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• When Alice logs in with password $w$, server computes hash($w$) and compares to Alice’s record
Password hashing: problems

• Offline password guessing
  – Dictionary attack: attacker tries all passwords against each hash(w)
  – Study shows that a dictionary of $2^{20}$ passwords can guess 50% of passwords

• Amortized password hashing
  – Idea: One brute force scan for all/many hashes
  – Build table (H(password), password) for all $2^{20}$ passwords
  – Crack 50% of passwords in this one pass
LinkedIn was storing $h(password)$

It was the number one hacked password, according to Rapid7. But many other LinkedIn users also picked passwords — "work" and "job" for example — that were associated with the career site's content.

Religion was also a popular password topic — "god," "angel" and "jesus" also made the top 15. Number sequences such as "1234" and "12345" also made the list.
Password cracking software

2. John the Ripper: Multi-platform, Powerful, Flexible password cracking tool

John the Ripper is a free multi or cross platform password cracking software. It's called multi platform as it combines different password cracking features into one package.

It's primarily used to crack weak UNIX passwords but also available for Linux, Mac, and Windows. We can run this software against different password encryptions including many password hashes normally found in different UNIX versions. These hashes are DES, LM hash of Windows NT/2000/XP/2003, MD5, and AFS.

![John the Ripper interface](image)

Cain and Abel

Brutus

THC Hydra
Prevent amortized guessing attack

- Randomize hashes with salt
- Server stores \((\text{salt}, \text{hash(password, salt)})\), salt is random
- Two equal passwords have different hashes now
- Need to do one brute force attack \textit{per hash} now, not one brute force attack for many hashes at once
Salted hash example

Server stores:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>username</th>
<th>salt</th>
<th>hash of password</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>235545235</td>
<td>hash(Alice’s password, 235545235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob</td>
<td>678632523</td>
<td>hash(Bob’s password, 678632523)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attacker tries to guess Alice’s password:

Computes table

| ‘aaaaaa’ | hash(‘aaaaaa’, 235545235), hash(‘aaaaaab’, 235545235), ...
| ‘zzzzzzz’| hash(‘zzzzzz’, 235545235) |

This table is useless for Bob’s password because of different salt.
Increase security further

- Would like to slow down attacker in doing a dictionary attack
- Use *slow hashes* = takes a while to compute the hash
- Define
  \[ H(x) = \text{hash(hash(hash(...hash(x))))} \]
  use with \( x = \text{password} \| \text{salt} \)

- Tension: time for user to authenticate & login vs attacker time
- If \( H \) is 1000 times slower and attack takes a day with \( H \), attack now takes 3 years with \( F \)
Conclusions

- Do not store passwords in cleartext
- Store them hashed with salts, slower hash functions better